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In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first 
combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an 
efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were 
assigned. This note briefly reviews the auction. 
After examining the auction data, I find no evidence that the auction was less than fully 
efficient. The bidders had an opportunity to express their true preferences, and there was little 
incentive for them to do otherwise as a result of the second price rule. Thus, I expect that the bids 
did reflect true preferences, in which case the outcome was fully efficient.  
The bids of a few bidders were non-monotonic—a larger amount was bid for a package that 
was a strict subset of another package. In some cases this appeared to be the result of constraints 
from the activity rule, suggesting that some bidders failed to bid on the largest profitable package 
during the clock rounds. These binding activity rule constraints may have reduced auction 
revenues, but I doubt efficiency was compromised. 
I begin with a description of the 10-40 GHz setting. Then I examine the principal stage of 
the auction, including both the clock rounds and the supplementary bids. Then I discuss the 
assignment stage. 
1  Summary of environment and auction format 
The 10-40 GHz auction included ten national lots at 10 GHz, two national and three sub-
national lots at 28 GHz, and six national lots each at 32 GHz and 40 GHz. The spectrum is 
suitable for many possible uses, such as fixed wireless access or backhaul. Some applications 
require aggregating multiple contiguous lots. For this reason a package auction was desirable, 
especially given the desire for the auction to be technology neutral. Since national lots within a 
particular band were believed to be nearly perfect substitutes, it made sense to simplify the 
auction with the use of generic national lots in each of the four bands.  
The 10-40 GHz auction was Ofcom’s first use of the combinatorial clock auction format. 
The combinatorial clock auction is a simple yet powerful package auction. It enables the auction 
to determine the successful technology, rather than the regulator. Since at every point in the 
auction bidders are bidding on mutually exclusive packages of lots, there is no exposure 
problem. A bidder never runs the risk of winning just some of what it needs. Also, bids are 
binding commitments, and any of the bidder’s bids throughout the entire auction may be part of 
the winning set. This provides a strong incentive for a bidder to bid in a way that is consistent 
with its preferences. The combinatorial clock auction allows package bids without introducing 
the complexity that is often associated with combinatorial auctions. Rather the auction begins 
with a simple and familiar price discovery process, followed by a final round of bidding. Only at 
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the end of the supplementary round does the auctioneer need to solve an optimization problem to 
determine the quantity of spectrum won by each bidder. The optimization takes just seconds for a 
problem the size of the 10-40 GHz auction. Finally, to determine the specific assignments, 
winners express preferences over the various specific assignments consistent with the generic 
awards. 
The combinatorial clock auction has an activity rule to encourage price discovery. Without 
an activity rule, a bidder may wait until the supplementary round before submitting serious bids, 
and thereby undermine price discovery. The auction used the eligibility point rule—as prices 
increase the package size can stay the same or decrease; it cannot increase.  
Under the eligibility point rule, a bidder’s best strategy in the clock stage is not the natural 
one of bidding on its most profitable package given the round prices. Rather, the best strategy is 
to bid on its largest package that is still profitable. Only with this strategy can the bidder be sure 
that it will be able to bid its full value for desirable packages in the supplementary round. If the 
bidder instead bid on its most profitable package in each round of the clock stage, the bidder 
likely would face severe constraints in its supplementary bids for packages larger than its final 
clock package. Sometimes these constraints can result in nonmonotonic bids in which the bidder 
submits a higher bid for a package that is a strict subset of a larger package. 
2 Principal  stage 
The outcome of the principal stage is shown in Table 1. Remarkably, all ten bidders won at 
least one lot. This would suggest that the threshold problem—the difficultly that small bidders 
sometimes face in package auctions—was not significant. There is no evidence that small 
bidders failed to top some large package bids, because of a failure to bid full values. 















nat Bid Opp. cost Base price
Arqiva 2 1,599,000 260,500 260,500
BT 1 1,001,000 179,000 179,000
Digiweb 2 142,000 39,000 39,000
Faultbasic 1 750,000 30,000 30,000
MLL 1 1 250,000 179,000 179,000
Orange 2 2,999,999 261,000 261,000
RedM 1 34,000 10,000 10,000
TMobile 8 2 1 8,500,000 319,000 319,000
Transfinite 1 97,000 20,000 20,000
UKBB 4 420,000 120,000 120,000
Total 10 2 1 1 1 6 6 15,792,999 1,417,500 1,417,500  
For each winning package, the bid amount, the opportunity cost, and the base price are 
shown. All prices throughout this note are in pounds. The opportunity cost is the Vickrey price. 
Notice that for each of the ten bidders the base price is equal to the opportunity cost. This means 
that none of the bidders could have gained by manipulating the bids. Bidding true value was the 
best strategy.   3
2.1 Clock  rounds 
The auction had 17 clock rounds. The rounds are shown in Table 2. For each of the seven 
categories, the price, demand, and excess demand is given. The auctioneer did a good job of 
adjusting prices in response to excess demand. This is seen by fairly smooth reduction of excess 
demand throughout the clock rounds. Remarkably, the clock stage concluded with six of the 
seven categories in supply and demand balance. Often in package auctions, the clock stage 
concludes with a larger number of categories with excess supply. 
Table 2. Clock rounds 
Round Price demand excess price demand excess price demand excess price demand excess price demand excess price demand excess price demand excess
1 10,000 21 11 60,000 4 2 20,000 3 2 10,000 1 0 30,000 3 2 60,000 19 13 30,000 8 2
2 12,000 23 13 72,000 5 3 24,000 2 1 10,000 2 1 36,000 3 2 72,000 17 11 36,000 7 1
3 14,000 23 13 86,000 6 4 29,000 1 0 11,000 2 1 43,000 3 2 86,000 16 10 40,000 5 -1
4 17,000 18 8 103,000 6 4 29,000 1 0 13,000 2 1 52,000 2 1 103,000 14 8 40,000 8 2
5 20,000 18 8 124,000 5 3 29,000 2 1 16,000 2 1 62,000 2 1 124,000 14 8 44,000 7 1
6 24,000 20 10 149,000 6 4 32,000 2 1 19,000 2 1 74,000 2 1 149,000 12 6 48,000 6 0
7 29,000 18 8 179,000 4 2 38,000 2 1 23,000 2 1 89,000 1 0 179,000 12 6 48,000 9 3
8 35,000 18 8 215,000 4 2 46,000 1 0 28,000 2 1 89,000 1 0 215,000 10 4 55,000 8 2
9 42,000 18 8 258,000 3 1 46,000 1 0 34,000 1 0 89,000 1 0 258,000 8 2 66,000 11 5
10 50,000 18 8 310,000 3 1 46,000 1 0 34,000 1 0 89,000 1 0 310,000 7 1 79,000 11 5
11 60,000 11 1 372,000 3 1 46,000 2 1 34,000 1 0 89,000 1 0 341,000 9 3 95,000 6 0
12 63,000 11 1 446,000 3 1 51,000 2 1 34,000 1 0 89,000 1 0 409,000 8 2 95,000 8 2
13 66,000 11 1 535,000 2 0 61,000 2 1 34,000 1 0 89,000 1 0 491,000 7 1 105,000 9 3
14 69,000 10 0 535,000 1 -1 73,000 2 1 34,000 1 0 89,000 2 1 540,000 7 1 126,000 8 2
15 69,000 10 0 535,000 3 1 88,000 1 0 34,000 1 0 98,000 3 2 594,000 5 -1 151,000 5 -1
16 69,000 10 0 589,000 3 1 88,000 2 1 34,000 2 1 118,000 2 1 594,000 5 -1 151,000 4 -2
17 69,000 10 0 707,000 2 0 97,000 1 0 37,000 1 0 130,000 1 0 594,000 6 0 151,000 5 -1
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Although the final clock prices are not a good indicator of base prices, the clock prices are a 
good indicator of the relative prices paid for packages. Table 3 compares the bid, the base price, 
and the final clock price for each bidder’s winning package. Notice that the ratio of the base 
price and the winning bid varies widely across bidders—from 4% to 72%. In sharp contrast, the 
ratio of the base price and the final clock prices is fairly steady across bidders, ranging from 17% 
to 30%. This means that the final clock prices were a good indicator of relative prices. 
A disadvantage of the eligibility point activity rule is that the final clock prices tend to be 
high relative to base prices. The reason is that during the clock stage bidders optimally bid on the 
largest profitable package given the round prices, rather than the most profitable package. Thus, 
the bidders continue to bid on larger packages when the smaller packages are more profitable. 
Excess demand is greater and clock prices are pushed higher than they would be if bidders bid on 
their most profitable package in each round. The 10-40 GHz auction clearly illustrates this 
tendency. Final clock prices were roughly five times higher than the base prices. 
Table 3. Comparison of bid, base price, and final clock price 





Arqiva 1,599,000 260,500 1,414,000 16% 18%
BT 1,001,000 179,000 594,000 18% 30%
Digiweb 142,000 39,000 138,000 27% 28%
Faultbasic 750,000 30,000 130,000 4% 23%
MLL 250,000 179,000 745,000 72% 24%
Orange 2,999,999 261,000 1,188,000 9% 22%
RedM 34,000 10,000 37,000 29% 27%
TMobile 8,500,000 319,000 1,891,000 4% 17%
Transfinite 97,000 20,000 97,000 21% 21%
UKBB 420,000 120,000 604,000 29% 20%
Total 15,792,999 1,417,500 6,838,000 9% 21%    4
The clock rounds appeared to be helpful for both price discovery and assignment discovery. 
Table 4 shows the final clock bid and the winning bid for each bidder. In many cases, the 
bidder’s winning package is the same or nearly the same as the bidder’s final package bid. In 
nine of the ten cases, the winning bid was a supplementary bid. Only two of the ten bidders 
exited the clock stage before round 17. 
Table 4. Comparison of final clock bids and winning bids 
Bidder Round Bid price q price q price q price q price q price q price q
Arqiva 17 1,451,000 69,000 707,000 2 97,000 37,000 1 130,000 594,000 151,000
Arqiva SB 1,599,000 - - 2 - - - - -
BT 17 896,000 69,000 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 594,000 1 151,000 2
BT SB 1,001,000 - - - - - - 1 -
Digiweb 17 138,000 69,000 2 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 594,000 151,000
Digiweb SB 142,000 - 2 - - - - - -
Faultbasic 17 281,000 69,000 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 1 594,000 151,000 1
Faultbasic SB 750,000 - - - - - 1 - -
MLL 8 215,000 35,000 215,000 1 46,000 28,000 89,000 215,000 55,000
MLL SB 250,000 - - - - - - 1 - 1
Orange 17 1,782,000 69,000 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 594,000 3 151,000
Orange SB 2,999,999 - - - - - - 2 -
RedM 8 28,000 35,000 215,000 46,000 28,000 1 89,000 215,000 55,000
RedM SB 34,000 - - - - 1 - - -
TMobile 17 1,891,000 69,000 8 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 594,000 2 151,000 1
TMobile SB 8,500,000 - 8 - - - - - 2 - 1
Transfinite 17 97,000 69,000 707,000 97,000 1 37,000 130,000 594,000 151,000
Transfinite SB 97,000 - - - 1 - - - -
UKBB 17 151,000 69,000 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 594,000 151,000 1
UKBB 13 420,000 66,000 535,000 61,000 34,000 89,000 491,000 105,000 4
Note: Final clock bids are in white; winning bids are in yellow.
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2.2 Supplementary  bids 
Supplementary bids are intended for bidders to increase their clock bids to full value and add 
bids on any additional packages that are relevant but were not bid on during the clock rounds. 
Bidding behavior varied a great deal across bidders. 
Table 5 shows the total number of bids and the number of supplementary bids submitted by 
each bidder. Only BT and TMobile submitted a large number of supplementary bids. All the 
bidders but BT and TMobile simply increased clock bids, and added a handful of supplementary 
bids on packages closely related to their bids in the latter part of the clock stage. This is what one 
would expect from bidders following the safe strategy of bidding on the largest profitable 
package in the clock stage and then bidding full values on relevant packages in the 
supplementary round.   5
















Total 738 712  
Faultbasic’s supplementary bids are non-monotonic (Table 6). In particular, Faultbasic’s 
winning bid of 750,000 for one 28GHz sub3 lot is substantially more than its bid for several 
other lots that include one 28GHz sub3 lot as part of a larger package. Some of the non-
monotonicities are explained by constraints imposed by the activity rule, but others occur for 
packages unconstrained by the activity rule. All bids of size 6 or less were unconstrained. 
Table 6. Non-monotonicity of Faultbasic’s supplementary bids 
Bidder Round Activity Bid price q price q price q price q price q price q price q
Faultbasic 17 6 281,000 69,000 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 1 594,000 151,000 1
Faultbasic SB 9 223,000 - - 1 - - - 1 - -
Faultbasic SB 9 389,000 - - 1 - - - - - 1
Faultbasic SB 6 535,000 - - 1 - - - - -
Faultbasic SB 3 750,000 - - - - - 1 - -
Faultbasic SB 6 350,000 - - - - - 1 - - 1
Faultbasic SB 9 380,000 - - - - - 1 - 1 -
Faultbasic SB 6 180,000 - - - 1 - 1 - 1 - -
Faultbasic SB 4 160,000 - - - - 1 - 1 - -
Faultbasic SB 5 170,000 - - - 1 - - 1 - -
Faultbasic SB 8 230,000 - - - 1 - - 1 - - 1
Faultbasic SB 9 264,000 - - - 1 - 1 - 1 - - 1
Faultbasic SB 7 218,000 - - - - 1 - 1 - - 1
Note: Winning bid in yellow.
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BT’s clock bids are shown in Table 7. BT switched its package whenever maintaining the 
same package would result in a bid in excess of 1,000,000. Until the last few rounds of the clock 
stage, BT focused entirely on the 32GHz and 40GHz lots. In round 15 and 16, BT shifted to 
include 28GHz lots. BT’s bid in round 17 eliminated the remaining excess demand and shifted to 
categories with excess supply; it ended the clock stage.    6
Table 7. BT’s clock bids 
Bidder Round Activity Bid price q price q price q price q price q price q price q
BT 1 42 420,000 10,000 60,000 20,000 10,000 30,000 60,000 6 30,000 2
BT 2 42 504,000 12,000 72,000 24,000 10,000 36,000 72,000 6 36,000 2
BT 3 42 596,000 14,000 86,000 29,000 11,000 43,000 86,000 6 40,000 2
BT 4 42 698,000 17,000 103,000 29,000 13,000 52,000 103,000 6 40,000 2
BT 5 42 832,000 20,000 124,000 29,000 16,000 62,000 124,000 6 44,000 2
BT 6 42 990,000 24,000 149,000 32,000 19,000 74,000 149,000 6 48,000 2
BT 7 36 991,000 29,000 179,000 38,000 23,000 89,000 179,000 5 48,000 2
BT 8 30 970,000 35,000 215,000 46,000 28,000 89,000 215,000 4 55,000 2
BT 9 30 912,000 42,000 258,000 46,000 34,000 89,000 258,000 2 66,000 6
BT 10 24 936,000 50,000 310,000 46,000 34,000 89,000 310,000 2 79,000 4
BT 11 21 967,000 60,000 372,000 46,000 34,000 89,000 341,000 2 95,000 3
BT 12 21 884,000 63,000 446,000 51,000 34,000 89,000 409,000 1 95,000 5
BT 13 18 911,000 66,000 535,000 61,000 34,000 89,000 491,000 1 105,000 4
BT 14 15 918,000 69,000 535,000 73,000 34,000 89,000 540,000 1 126,000 3
BT 15 15 935,000 69,000 535,000 1 88,000 34,000 98,000 1 594,000 151,000 2
BT 16 15 980,000 69,000 589,000 1 88,000 1 34,000 1 118,000 1 594,000 151,000 1
BT 17 12 896,000 69,000 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 594,000 1 151,000 2
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In the supplementary round, BT submitted 545 bids, far more than any other bidder. Nearly 
all the bids that were not constrained by the activity rule were for approximately 1,000,000. The 
highest bid, including the winning bid, was for 1,001,000. The bids were non-monotonic. The 
winning bid was for a single 32GHz lot. There were hundreds of bids that included one or more 
32GHz lots as well as other lots, yet were bid at 1,001,000 or less. Many of the non-
monotonicities appear to be the result of the activity rule, as well as a tight constraint on bids of 
1,001,000. BT had many supplementary bids that included 10GHz lots, despite the fact that BT 
never bid on the 10GHz lots in the clock stage. 
TMobile consistently bid for 8 10GHz lots, 2 32GHz lots, and 1 40GHz lot throughout the 
clock stage. In the early rounds, some 28GHz lots were included as well. In the supplementary 
round, TMobile again focused on this core package, which it ultimately won with a bid of 
8,500,000. Larger variations of this package were sharply constrained by the activity rule, as 
shown in Table 8. TMobile failed to bid on packages with more than 23 eligibility points during 
the clock stage; whereas according to its supplementary bids, its largest profitable package was 
for at least 26 eligibility points, and as a result all such packages larger than 23 were sharply 
constrained by the activity rule. 
Table 8. TMobile’s bids indicating activity rule constraint 
Bidder Round Activity Bid price q price q price q price q price q price q price q
TMobile 17 23 1,891,000 69,000 8 707,000 97,000 37,000 130,000 594,000 2 151,000 1
TMobile SB 26 514,000 - 8 - - - - 1 - 2 - 1
TMobile SB 25 811,000 - 8 - - 1 - - - 2 - 1
TMobile SB 23 8,500,000 - 8 - - - - - 2 - 1
TMobile SB 26 514,000 - 8 - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - 1
TMobile SB 25 811,000 - 8 - 1 - 1 - - - 1 - 1
TMobile SB 25 819,000 - 7 - - - - 1 - 2 - 1
TMobile SB 25 819,000 - 7 - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - 1
TMobile SB 24 793,000 - 8 - - - 1 - - 2 - 1
TMobile SB 24 793,000 - 8 - 1 - - 1 - - 1 - 1
TMobile SB 24 776,000 - 7 - - 1 - - - 2 - 1
TMobile SB 24 776,000 - 7 - 1 - 1 - - - 1 - 1
TMobile SB 24 784,000 - 6 - - - - 1 - 2 - 1
TMobile SB 24 784,000 - 6 - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - 1
TMobile SB 23 8,435,597 - 7 - - - 1 - - 2 - 1
28GHz sub3 32GHz nat 40GHz nat 10GHz nat 28GHz nat 28GHz sub1 28GHz sub2
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2.3 Optimization 
The optimization at the end of the principal stage was performed using two independent 
optimizers. Both optimizers found the same solutions. There were two solutions with an optimal 
objective value of 15,792,999. The two solutions differed only in whether one 40GHz lot was 
assigned to BT or MLL. The randomly selected solution awarded MLL the 40GHz lot in 
question. With 10 bidders and 738 bids, the optimization took 0.16 seconds to solve the winner 
determination problem, 0.30 seconds to find the Vickrey prices (opportunity costs), and 0.11 
seconds to determine the bidder-optimal core prices (base prices). Since the Vickrey prices did 
not violate any core constraints, these prices are the unique bidder-optimal core prices. 
3 Assignment  stage 
The assignment stage was straightforward. Since the two 28GHz national lots were won by a 
single party, only three categories had multiple options to consider. Table 9 lists all the 
possibilities together with the bids for each bidder, and the opportunity cost and additional price 
for each winning bid.    8
Table 9. Assignment stage bids and outcome 
10GHz national
Bidder Option Bid Opp. cost Price
Digiweb Lots 1 and 2 0
Digiweb Lots 9 and 10 5,255 0 0
TMobile Lots 1 to 8 0 0 0
TMobile Lots 3 to 10 0
32GHz national
Bidder Option Bid Opp. cost Price
BT Lot 1 0
BT Lot 2 10,000
BT Lot 3 5,000
BT Lot 4 4,000
BT Lot 5 9,000 3,000 4,000
BT Lot 6 0
MLL Lot 1 0
MLL Lot 2 3,000
MLL Lot 3 5,000
MLL Lot 4 5,000
MLL Lot 5 3,000
MLL Lot 6 0 0 0
Orange Lots 1 and 2 105,000 11,130 11,130
Orange Lots 2 and 3 15,000
Orange Lots 3 and 4 0
Orange Lots 4 and 5 15,000
Orange Lots 5 and 6 15,000
TMobile Lots 1 and 2 20,229
TMobile Lots 2 and 3 15,151
TMobile Lots 3 and 4 10,099 1,000 1,000
TMobile Lots 4 and 5 5,048
TMobile Lots 5 and 6 0
40GHz national
Bidder Option Bid Opp. cost Price
MLL Lot 1 0
MLL Lot 2 5,000 0 0
MLL Lot 5 5,000
MLL Lot 6 0
TMobile Lot 1 56,279 1,000 1,000
TMobile Lot 2 54,279
TMobile Lot 5 2,219
TMobile Lot 6 0
UKBB Lots 1 to 4 1,000
UKBB Lots 2 to 5 0
UKBB Lots 3 to 6 0 0 0
Note: Winning bids in yellow.  
The most interesting aspect of the assignment bids is how small the bids are relative to the 
winning principal stage bids, as shown in Table 10. The additional value that a bidder gets from 
its most preferred specific assignment was never more than 4% of the bidder’s winning principal 
bid, and was only 1% across all bidders. This confirms that the approach of auctioning generic 
lots first was sound. Although bidders do care somewhat about specific assignments, the   9
importance of the specific assignment is second-order—much less than a single bid increment. 
Moreover, as a result of the optimization, bidders were able to secure 92% of the total value 
potentially available, assuming each bidder got its first choice, as a result of desirable specific 
assignments. Overall, the additional payment was less than 10% of the additional value received.  















BT 1,001,000 10,000 9,000 4,000 1% 90%
Digiweb 142,000 5,255 5,255 4% 100%
Faultbasic 750,000
MLL 250,000 10,000 5,000 4% 50%
Orange 2,999,999 105,000 105,000 11,130 4% 100%
RedM 34,000
TMobile 8,500,000 76,508 66,378 2,000 1% 87%
Transfinite 97,000
UKBB 420,000 1,000 0% 0%
Total 15,792,999 207,763 190,633 17,130 1% 92%  
All the additional prices were Vickrey prices (opportunity cost), with the exception of BT’s, 
which was 4,000 (1,000 more than the Vickrey price). Thus, as in the principal stage, there were 
strong incentives to bid full values in the assignment stage. 
3.1 Optimization 
Again two independent optimizers were used to find the optimal assignment. Both 
optimizers found the same unique solution. All assignments and prices were determined in a 
combined time of 0.05 seconds. 
4 Conclusion 
The 10-40 GHz auction successfully demonstrated the desirable features of the 
combinatorial clock auction. Bidding for generic lots greatly simplified the bidding. The bidders 
had strong incentives to submit truthful bids in the supplementary round and in the assignment 
stage. Assuming they did, then the outcome was fully efficient. 
Competition in the auction was somewhat weak. This is the primary reason why all bidders 
were successful in winning spectrum and revenues were only 9% of values. 
My only concern is with the activity rule in the principal stage. First, the eligibility point 
rule led to final clock prices that were higher than they may have been under a different rule, and 
the final clock prices were nearly five times as high as the base prices. Second, the eligibility 
point rule gives the bidders a high degree of flexibility in bidding on less desirable packages 
during the clock stage, which may undermine price discovery. In addition, if a bidder fails to bid 
on its largest profitable package in each round of the clock stage, the bidder’s bids on large 
packages are sharply constrained in the supplementary round. Several bidders had supplementary 
bids constrained by the activity rule. These constraints likely reduced revenues, but I have little 
evidence to suggest that the constraints created any inefficiencies. One bidder, BT, seemed to use 
the flexibility of the eligibility point rule to submit a large number of supplementary bids, which   10
were non-monotonic and for packages different from the preferences expressed in the primary 
rounds. 
Overall, the identified anomalies likely did not compromise the efficiency of the auction. I 
view the outcome as a highly successful test of the combinatorial clock auction design.  